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I.

INTRODUCTION

In MacDonald v. Moose, 1 a split panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit granted a petition for a writ of habeas corpus to undo the state
criminal conviction of an adult for soliciting oral sex from a minor.2 Based on
Lawrence v. Texas, 3 the court held a longstanding Virginia prohibition of
bestiality and sodomy to be partially facially unconstitutional. 4 Its decision left
the bestiality prohibition untouched while holding the sodomy prohibition
completely unenforceable, even as applied in cases involving minors. 5
The panel majority misapplied the deferential standard of review required by
Congress for federal habeas review of state court convictions. 6 And the court's
analysis further muddled the already confused doctrine surrounding facial and
as-applied challenges. More fundamentally, the panel majority's concern about
the supposed need to engage in a "drastic" "judicial reformation" of Virginia's
law to render it compatible with Lawrence was simply misplaced. 7 The court
could have-and should have-easily applied Virginia's law together with
Lawrence, just as the Virginia courts did in the decade between Lawrence and
MacDonald.

'Associate Professor, University of Richmond School of Law.
I.
710 F.3d 154 (4th Cir. 2013).
2. Id. at 155-56.
3.
539 U.S. 558 (2003).
4.
See MacDonald, 710 F.3d at 166.
5. Id. at 166-67.
6.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2012) (providing that a writ of habeas corpus shall not be granted
unless the state decision was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law," or "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented").
7.
See MacDonald, 710 F.3d at 165-66 (citing Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New
England, 546 U.S. 320, 323 (2006)).
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II. BACKGROUND

MacDonald v. Moose addressed the effect of Lawrence v. Texas on a
Virginia statute criminalizing bestiality and sodomy. 8 William MacDonald was
convicted in the Circuit Court of the City of Colonial Heights of soliciting a
minor to violate Virginia's sodomy prohibition and contributing to the
delinquency of a minor. 9 At the time of the events giving rise to his prosecution
(September of 2004), MacDonald was a forty-seven-year-old male and the minor
was a seventeen-year-old female. 10 Putting aside the age difference for a
moment and focusing just on the solicited act, MacDonald did not solicit what
many people think of as a felony. He did not ask for help with robbing a bank or
assaulting an enemy, but rather to perform oral sex. 11 Moreover, the minor said
"no" and they did not then engage in oral sex. 12 It was only a few months later
that MacDonald came to law enforcement's attention through an unusual
combination of circumstances, and he was ultimately charged with and convicted
of solicitation. 13
MacDonald's solicitation conviction was based on two Virginia laws: (1) the
law prohibiting solicitation of a minor to commit a predicate felony 14 and (2) the
law defining the predicate felony. 15 In MacDonald's case, the predicate felony
was sodomy in violation of Virginia Code section 18.2-361(A): "If any person
carnally knows in any manner any brute animal, or carnally knows any male or
female person by the anus or by or with the mouth, or voluntarily submits to
such carnal knowledge, he or she shall be guilty of a Class 6 felony .... " 16
Section 18.2-361(A)'s blanket prohibition of bestiality and sodomy was
obviously unconstitutional in many of its potential applications after Lawrence. 17
In Lawrence, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the convictions of two adult men
18
under a Texas law that prohibited sodomy between individuals of the same sex.

8. Id. at 156, 160.
9. Id. at 157-58.
10. Id. at 156-57.
11. Id. at 157 (citation omitted). MacDonald said he never asked the minor to perform
fellatio on him, but a judge found otherwise in a non-jury trial. See id. at 157 & n.4. MacDonald's
sufficiency of the evidence arguments failed, and they were not at issue by the time his federal
habeas petition reached the Fourth Circuit. See MacDonald v. Holder, No. 1:09cvl047(GBL/TRJ),
2011WL4498973, at *7 (E.D. Va. Sept. 26, 2011), rev'd sub nom. MacDonald v. Moose, 710 F.3d
154 (4th Cir. 2013).
12. MacDonald, 710 F.3d at 157.
13. Id. at 157, 158. One of these unusual circumstances was MacDonald's filing of a police
report complaining that the minor had forcibly abducted him and sexually assaulted him. Id. at 157.
Police interviewed her and credited her version of events over his. Id. MacDonald was also
charged with filing a false police report. Id.
14. Id. at 155 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-29 (2009)).
15. Id. at 156 (citing VA. CODE ANN.§ 18.2-361 (2009)).
16. VA. CODE ANN.§ 18.2-36l(A).
17. See 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (holding unconstitutional convictions for adult, consensual,
private, noncommercial conduct violating a statutory prohibition of sodomy).
18. Id. at 562-63, 579.
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The Court concluded that enforcement of the Texas law unconstitutionally
invaded the protected liberty interests of adults engaged in private, consensual,
noncommercial sexual behavior. 19 The Court in Lawrence asked "whether the
petitioners were free as adults to engage in the private conduct in the exercise of
their liberty under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution."20 And the Court answered that the state cannot criminally punish
"two adults who, with full and mutual consent from each other, engaged in
sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle .... Their right to liberty
under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct
without intervention of the govemment." 21
Lawrence did not guarantee constitutional protection for every sexual
activity that comes within the sweep of Virginia Code section 18.2-361(A). It
would require a creative extension of Lawrence, for example, to find in that
decision constitutional protection for someone who "carnally knows ... [a] brute
animal." 22 And the opinion for the Court explicitly limited its recognition of the
constitutionally protected liberty interests at issue to adult, consensual, private,
noncommercial sexual conduct: "The present case does not involve minors. It
does not involve persons who might be injured or coerced or who are situated in
relationships where consent might not easily be refused. It does not involve
public conduct or prostitution."23
After Lawrence, then, an important question that arose for laws like section
18.2-36 l(A) of the Virginia Code was whether such laws could constitutionally
be enforced in circumstances that would not trespass on the personal liberty
interests recognized in Lawrence. Virginia's courts said "yes" in MacDonald's
case and others.
In the state appellate court decision at issue in MacDonald's federal habeas
pet1t10n, the Virginia Court of Appeals analyzed MacDonald's
unconstitutionality-based defense as presenting both a facial and an as-applied
challenge. 24 The court rejected both. It grounded its reasoning on an earlier
appellate opinion that affirmed MacDonald's convictions for four counts of
sodomy arising out of a different prosecution in a different jurisdiction. 25

19. Id. at 578.
20. Id. at 564.
21. Id. at 578.
22. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-36l(A). For a somewhat whimsical overview of how such an
argument might proceed, see Eugene Kontorovich, The Bestiality Brief, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY
(Dec. 5, 2012, 4:20 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2012/12/05/zoophilia-sex-toys-and-theconsitutional-protection-of-autonomous-sex/.
23. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
24. MacDonald v. Commonwealth, Rec. No. 1939-05-02, 2007 WL 43635, at *l (Va. Ct.
App. Jan. 9, 2007).
25. Id.; see also McDonald v. Commonwealth, 630 S.E.2d 754, 755-56 (Va. Ct. App. 2006).
The sodomy prosecution was in Prince George County, while the solicitation prosecution was in the
City of Colonial Heights. MacDonald, 2007 WL 43635; McDonald, 630 S.E.2d 754. The sodomy
prosecution was based on four incidents between December 2002 and August 2004. McDonald,
630 S.E.2d at 755. Two of the incidents involved the same seventeen-year-old female whose
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In that earlier opinion, the Virginia Court of Appeals first rejected
MacDonald's facial challenge on the ground that "a party has standing to
challenge the constitutionality of a statute only insofar as it has an adverse
impact on his own rights." 26 The court then rejected MacDonald's as-applied
challenge on the ground that "Lawrence made quite clear that its ruling did not
apply to sexual acts involving children."27
In holding that Lawrence provides no constitutional protection for sodomy
involving an adult and a minor, the Virginia Court of Appeals explained that
Lawrence's inapplicability to "acts involving minors" was one of four exceptions
to the Lawrence Court's holding: "The Supreme Court found that acts involving
minors along with non-consensual acts, public conduct, and prostitution do not
merit due process protection." 28 And the court relied on Martin v. Zihert2 9-a
post-Lawrence decision of the Supreme Court of Virginia that held Virginia's
fornication statute unconstitutional-while also noting that "this case does not
involve
minors,
non-consensual
act1v1ty,
prostitution
or
public
activity. . . . [S]tate regulation of that type of activity might support a different
result." 30 The court further noted its own prior use of "the exceptions noted in
Lawrence to uphold the constitutionality of Code [section] 18.2-361(A) in other
settings," namely "in affirming the conviction of a man accused of public
sodomy based on the public acts exception in Lawrence."31 Finally, the court
observed that "[ o ]ther jurisdictions have found these stated exceptions to be
situations where the behavior is not a protected liberty interest."32
After exhausting available appellate and post-conviction review in state
court, MacDonald petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District

interactions with MacDonald formed the basis of the solicitation prosecution. MacDonald, 2007
WL 43635, at *l; McDonald, 630 S.E.2d at 755. The other two incidents involved a different minor
female, who was sixteen years old. McDonald, 630 S.E.2d at 755. MacDonald was forty-five at the
time of the first incident with this sixteen year-old and forty-six at the time of the second. Id.
26. McDonald, 630 S.E.2d at 756 (quoting Ulster Cnty. Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 154-55
(1979)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
27. Id. at 757 (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003)).
28. Id. (citing Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578).
29. 607 S.E.2d 367 (Va. 2005).
30. McDonald, 630 S.E.2d at 757-58 (quoting Martin, 607 S.E.2d at 371) (internal quotation
marks omitted); see also Martin, 607 S.E.2d at 371 ("[A]pplying the reasoning of
Lawrence . .. leads us to conclude that [the fornication statute] is unconstitutional because by
subjecting certain private sexual conduct between two consenting adults to criminal penalties it
infringes on the rights of adults to 'engage in ... the exercise of their liberty under the Due Process
Clause .... "' (quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564)).
31. Id. at 758 (citing Singson v. Commonwealth, 621 S.E.2d 682, 688 (Va. Ct. App. 2005)).
32. Id. (citing decisions from appellate courts in North Carolina, Ohio, and Washington); see
also id. at 757 (citing United States v. Bach, 400 F.3d 622, 629 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding that child
pornography was not protected under Lawrence); United States v. Sherr, 400 F. Supp. 2d 843, 850
(D. Md. 2005) (adopting the Eighth Circuit's reasoning in Bach); State v. Senters, 699 N.W.2d 810,
817 (Neb. 2005) (holding that Lawrence does not apply to children and that states may define the
age of majority).
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Court for the Eastern District ofVirginia. 33 As construed by the district courtand as relevant to the ultimate disposition of the petition by the Fourth CircuitMacDonald claimed in his petition that section 18.2-361(A) of the Virginia Code
34
was unconstitutional on its face and as aq~lied in his prosecution. The district
5
court disposed of the facial claim first.
The court reasoned that the state
court's holding that MacDonald "lacked standing to challenge the facial
constitutionality of ... [section] 18.2-361(A)" was not contrary to federal law
because "the principle relied upon was drawn directly from a United States
Supreme Court case." 36 The district court next disposed of the as-applied
claim, 37 stating that because "Virginia considers persons aged sixteen and
seventeen to be children, and the Supreme Court in Lawrence explicitly stated
that the ruling did not apply to sexual acts involving children," the state court
holding was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law. 38
III. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION

On appeal, a split panel of the Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded the case
"for an award of habeas corpus relief on the ground that the anti-sodomy
provision facially violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment." 39 Judge King wrote the opinion for the court, in which Judge
Motz joined. 40 Judge Diaz authored a dissent. 41
The panel majority first rejected the state court's reliance on the principle
that a party has standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statute only
insofar as it affects the party's own rights. 42 The court reasoned that this
principle was inapplicable because the statute's facial unconstitutionality
entailed its as-applied unconstitutionality. 43
The Fourth Circuit majority described Lawrence v. Texas as holding that
"statutes criminalizing private acts of consensual sodomy between adults are

33. MacDonald v. Holder, No. 1:09cvl047(GBL/TRJ), 2011 WL 4498973, at *l (E.D. Va.
Sept. 26, 2011), rev'd sub nom. MacDonald v. Moose, 710 F.3d 154 (4th Cir. 2013).
34. Id. at *2. MacDonald also advanced an ex post facto claim and an insufficiency of the
evidence claim. Id.
35. Id. at *4.
36. Id. at *5 (citing Ulster Cnty. Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 154-55 (1979)). The Supreme
Court stated that "a party has standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statute only insofar as it
has an adverse impact on his own rights." Ulster Cnty. Court, 442 U.S. at 154-55.
37. MacDonald,2011 WL4498973,at*5.
38. Id. In evaluating the state court's ruling, the federal court applied the standard prescribed
in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2102). Id. at *2.
39. MacDonald v. Moose, 710F.3d154, 156 (4th Cir. 2013).
40. Id. at 155.
41. Id. at 167 (Diaz, J., dissenting).
42. See id. at 161-62 (majority opinion) (citations omitted).
43. Id. at 162 ("Because ... the anti-sodomy provision is unconstitutional when applied to
any person, the state court of appeals and the district court were incorrect in deeming the antisodomy provision to be constitutional as applied to MacDonald.").
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inconsistent with the protections of liberty assured by the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment."44 The core of the panel majority's reasoning
regarding the effect of Lawrence on Virginia Code section 18.2-361(A) rested on
its understanding of the Supreme Court's overruling of its earlier decision in
Bowers v. Hardwick. 45 The panel majority explained Bowers as a failed facial
challenge to a Georgia statute virtually identical to Virginia's; 46 in concluding
that "Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today,"
the Lawrence Court "recognized that the facial due process challenge in Bowers
was wrongly decided."47 According to the majority, the similarities between the
Georgia statute incorrectly upheld in Bowers and the Virginia statute underlying
MacDonald's conviction required a holding of facial unconstitutionality in
MacDonald's case: "Because the invalid Georgia statute in Bowers is materially
indistinguishable from the anti-sodomy provision being challenged here, the
latter provision likewise does not survive the Lawrence decision." 48
The court also reasoned that judicial narrowing of the sodomy prohibition to
apply only to minors would require forbidden judicial rewriting of the statutes. 49
The majority acknowledged that a more narrowly drawn sodomy prohibition
might be constitutional, but stated that the task of narrowing in these
circumstances was for the state legislature, not a federal court. 50 Although the
Supreme Court has stated that the preferred remedy is "to enjoin only the
unconstitutional applications of a statute while leaving other applications in
force," this sort of remedy has a limit: courts should not rewrite state law even as
they attempt to salvage it. 51 The panel majority reasoned that "a judicial
reformation of the anti-sodomy provision to criminalize MacDonald's conduct in
this case, and to do so in harmony with Lawrence, requires a drastic action that
runs afoul" of this principle. 52
Judge Diaz's dissent emphasized the deferential standard of review that a
federal court must apply in reviewing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 53 The dissent opened with Judge Diaz's assessment that
the state court's determination that Lawrence "invalidated sodomy laws only as
applied to private consenting adults" was not "so lacking in justification that

44. Id. at 163 (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003)).
45. Id. (citing Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571, 574-75, 577-78; Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)).
46. Id.
47. Id. (quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 165.
50. Id. ("The [Lawrence] Court's ruminations concerning the circumstances under which a
state might permissibly outlaw sodomy, however, no doubt contemplated deliberate action by the
people's representatives, rather than by the judiciary.").
51. Id. at 166 (quoting Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood ofN. New England, 546 U.S. 320, 32830 (2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
52. Id. at 165-66 (citing Ayotte, 546 U.S. 320).
53. See id. at 167 (Diaz, J., dissenting) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2012)).
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there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond
any possibility for fairminded disagreement." 54 The dissent next explained that
the two grounds relied upon by the majority for rejecting an as-applied
interpretation of Lawrence were unpersuasive. 55 The majority's reliance on the
overruling of Bowers, which the panel described as a failed facial challenge, was
a "stretch."56 According to Judge Diaz, the court should not have assumed "that
the Virginia General Assembly did not intend for its anti-sodomy provision to
apply to the conduct that Lawrence arguably exempted from constitutional
.
,,57
protect10n.
IV. ANALYSIS

Judge Diaz's dissent was correct in its able elaboration of various ways in
which the majority's analysis failed to abide by the deferential standard of
review for federal habeas review of state court convictions. 58 As he noted, the
crux of the state court's reasoning in MacDonald's case was that "Lawrence did
not facially invalidate all sodomy statutes, but rather only the ar plication of such
statutes to private, consensual sexual activity among adults." 5 This reading of
Lawrence is correct because the Lawrence Court's discussion throughout is
about the personal liberty interests of the adult petitioners in that case to engage
in the private, consensual, noncommercial conduct at issue. 60 But the question
before the Fourth Circuit in MacDonald was not even whether the state court

54. Id. at 167 (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786-87 (2011)) (citing
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted). While the majority
did not explicitly acknowledge the dissent's formulation of the standard, this formulation correctly
states the Supreme Court's binding doctrine interpreting the statutory standard ofreview. See, e.g.,
Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 786-87 ("As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus relief from a federal
court, a state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling ... was so lacking in justification that
there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for
fairminded disagreement.").
55. See MacDonald, 710 F.3d at 168 (Diaz, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 169 ("If it is difficult to discern from the Lawrence opinion whether it invalidated
all sodomy statutes, it is even more of a stretch to do so by negative inference from the case it
overturned.").
57. Id. at 171 (citing Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 569).
58. See id. at 167 (quoting Richardson v. Branker, 668 F.3d 128, 138 (4th Cir. 2012);
Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 786; Wolfe v. Johnson, 565 F.3d 140, 160 (4th Cir. 2009)).
59. Id. at 168 (footnote omitted).
60. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562 (noting that the "case involves liberty of the person both in its
spatial and in its more transcendent dimensions"); see id. at 564 ("We conclude the case should be
resolved by determining whether the petitioners were free as adults to engage in the private conduct
in the exercise of their liberty under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution."); see also id. at 572 (observing that "liberty gives substantial protection to adult
persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex"); id. at 578
(stating that petitioners' "right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to
engage in their conduct without intervention of the government").
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reasoning was right, only whether it was reasonable. 61 The applicable statutory
standard of review required an inquiry into whether the state court decision
"resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States."62 Noting what he called "the opaque language of
Lawrence," Judge Diaz observed that "[r]easonable jurists could disagree on
whether Lawrence represented a facial or an as-applied invalidation of the Texas
sodomy statute."63 And Judge Diaz's observation was plainly accurate. 64
Although Judge Diaz did not analyze the majority's discussion of facial
versus as-applied invalidation in much depth, his principal observation on this
point was devastating. Recall how the panel majority dealt with the Virginia
court's application of the unremarkable rule that a litigant generally cannot bring
a facial challenge against a statute that is constitutional as applied to that
litigant. 65 The panel majority said this was beside the point because the antisodomy provision was unconstitutional as applied to MacDonald-a conclusion
that followed from the panel majority's determination that the anti-sodomy
provision was facially unconstitutional. 66 As Judge Diaz pointed out, "this
analysis is circular." 67
Judge Diaz went on to say that the standing-to-raise-a-facial-challenge
principle did not matter in this case because the issue boiled down to the
question "whether Lawrence invalidated sodomy statutes on an as-applied or
facial basis." 68 Although Judge Diaz was right about the limited consequences
of the panel majority's circular reasoning for this particular case, that reasoning

61. See MacDonald, 710 F.3d at 167 (Diaz, J., dissenting) (quoting Richardson v. Branker,
668 F.3d 128, 138 (4th Cir. 2012)).
62. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(l) (2012).
63. MacDonald, 710 F.3d at 170 (Diaz, J., dissenting). Judge Diaz bolstered this observation
by citing two circuit court decisions describing the Lawrence decision as a facial invalidation of the
statute and two other circuit court decisions describing it as an as-applied invalidation of the statute.
See id. (citing Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 8 n.4 (1st Cir.
2012); Sylvester v. Fogley, 465 F.3d 851, 857 (8th Cir. 2006); Muth v. Frank, 412 F.3d 808, 812
(7th Cir. 2005); D.L.S. v. Utah, 374 F.3d 971, 975 (10th Cir. 2004)).
64. As this Author has explained elsewhere, the majority's description of the Supreme
Court's decision in Bowers v. Hardwick as resolving a facial challenge is also incorrect. Kevin C.
Walsh, The Fourth Circuit's Obviously (and Profoundly) Mistaken Habeas Grant Premised on the
Alleged Facial Unconstitutionality of Virginia's "Anti-sodomy Provision," WALSHSLAw (Mar. 13,
2013 ), http://walshslaw.wordpress.com/2013/03/13/the-fourth-circuits-obviously-and-profoundlymis taken-habeas-grant-premised-on-the-alleged-facial-unconstitutionality-of-virginias-anti-sodomyprovi sion/ (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 188 n.2 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)).
65. See MacDonald, 710 F.3d at 161-62 (majority opinion) (citations omitted).
66. Id. at 162 & n.11.
67. Id. at 168 n.3 (Diaz, J., dissenting).
68. Id.
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nevertheless has the potential to cause confusion in future cases through its
muddling of facial challenge doctrine. 69
To illustrate, consider the Fourth Circuit's decision in Woollard v.
Gallagher,70 decided less than two weeks after MacDonald. In Woollard, the
Fourth Circuit addressed a Second Amendment challenge to a Maryland gunpermitting requirement that required an applicant to show a "good and
substantial reason" to be able to carry a gun outside the applicant's home. 71 The
district court in Woollard held that this good-and-substantial-reason requirement
was facially unconstitutional. 72 But the Fourth Circuit approached it quite
differently. In addition to rejecting Woollard's claim that the permitting
requirement was unconstitutional as applied to him, the court held that Woollard
lacked standing to bring his facial challenge: "Because we conclude that the
good-and-substantial-reason requirement is constitutional under the Second
Amendment as applied to Appellee Woollard, we also must reject the Appellees'
facial challenge."73 According to the Fourth Circuit panel in Woollard, the
Supreme Court has instructed that "a person to whom a statute may
constitutionally be applied will not be heard to challenge that statute on the
ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others, in other
situations not before the Court." 74
This principle is the same principle applied by the Virginia Court of Appeals
in MacDonald's case. 75 But the reasoning in the two Fourth Circuit cases is
inconsistent. 76 And the inconsistency cannot be attributed to one panel's
unfamiliarity with the other panel's reasoning as the two cases made their way
through the decisional process. Woollard and MacDonald were argued before
the Fourth Circuit on the same day, 77 and two out of the three judges presided in
both cases: Judge King and Judge Diaz. 78 Most importantly, Judge King
authored both opinions. 79

69. See id. (recognizing the majority's reasoning that because the law "is facially
unconstitutional, it cannot be constitutional as applied to MacDonald").
70. 712 F.3d 865 (4th Cir. 2013).
71. Id. at 865, 868 (internal quotation marks omitted).
72. Woollard v. Sheridan, 863 F. Supp. 2d 462, 476 (D. Md. 2013), rev'd sub nom. Woollard
v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865 (4th Cir. 2013).
73. Woollard, 712 F.3d at 882.
74. Id. (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610 (1973)).
75. See MacDonald v. Commonwealth, Rec. No. 1939-05-2, 2007 WL 43635, *l (Va. Ct.
App. Jan. 9, 2007); McDonald v. Commonwealth, 630 S.E.2d 754, 756 (Va. Ct. App. 2006)
(quoting Ulster Cnty. Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 154-55 (1979)) (citing Singson v.
Commonwealth, 621 S.E.2d 682, 686 (Va. Ct. App. 2005)).
76. Compare Woollard, 712 F.3d at 882 (rejecting the appellee's facial constitutionality
challenge because the statute was constitutional as-applied to the appellee), with MacDonald v.
Moose, 710 F.3d 154, 161 (4th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted) (rejecting the principle that a litigant
may not challenge the facial constitutionality of a statute that is constitutional as applied to him
because the statute was facially unconstitutional).
77. See Woollard, 712 F.3d 865; MacDonald, 710 F.3d 154.
78. See Woollard, 712 F.3d at 868; MacDonald, 710 F.3d at 155.
79. See Woollard, 712 F.3d at 868; MacDonald, 710 F.3d at 155.
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It is far from clear why the appellees in Woollard could not have made the
same move endorsed by Judge King's panel majority opinion in MacDonald to
80
seek an initial determination of facial unconstitutionality. That is, after all, the
81
determination the district court made in Woollard.
Based on MacDonald, the
appellees in Woollard could have simply argued that advancing a facial
challenge was one of their grounds for seeking as-applied relief. To point out
the availability of this move is not to endorse it, of course, but rather to show that
it was a mistake for the panel majority to make the move available in
MacDonald.
The MacDonald dissent's second principal criticism of the panel majority
82
opinion-that the majority misapplied Ayotte-is also well-founded.
The
dissent argued that a proper application of Ayotte would have permitted the
continued enforceability of the anti-sodomy provision in circumstances not
. 83
covere db y L awrence ' s reasonmg.
Instead of treating section 18.2-361(A) of the Virginia Code as partially
facially unconstitutional, the Fourth Circuit should have treated it as the Virginia
courts did: unenforceable in those circumstances in which its enforcement would
infringe on the personal liberty interests recognized in Lawrence, but otherwise
84
enforceable.
Apart from resting on its mistaken reading of Lawrence, the panel also
reasoned that this "judicial reformation of the anti-sodomy provision" would be
85
"a drastic action that runs afoul of the Supreme Court's decision inAyotte." In
Ayotte, however, the Supreme Court directed that federal courts crafting
remedies for partially unconstitutional statutes should generally try "to limit the
solution to the problem," such as by "enjoin[ing] only the unconstitutional
86
applications of a statute while leaving other applications in force." The Court
did add that federal courts should not implement this general preference for
limited relief when crafting such relief would require "making distinctions in a
87
murky constitutional context, or where line-drawing is inherently complex."
And this is the part of Ayotte that the majority in MacDonald thought that
88
anything other than partial facial invalidation would run afoul of.
But the

80. See MacDonald, 710 F.3d at 162 n.11.
81. See Woollard v. Sheridan, 863 F. Supp. 2d 462, 464 (D. Md. 2012).
82. See MacDonald, 710 F.3d at 170-71 (Diaz, J., dissenting) (citing Ayotte v. Planned
Parenthood ofN. New England, 546 U.S. 320, 329-32 (2006)).
83. Id. at 170-71 (citing Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 329-32; Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 569
(2002)).
84. See McDonald v. Commonwealth, 630 S.E.2d 754, 757-58 (Va. Ct. App. 2006) (citations
omitted) (recognizing that Lawrence affords protection to adult, consensual, private, noncommercial
sexual behavior, but not to sexual acts involving adults and minors).
85. MacDonald, 710 F.3d. at 165-66 (citing Ayotte, 546 U.S. 320).
86. Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 328-29.
87. Id. at 330 (citing United States v. Nat'! Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 479 & n.26
(1995)).
88. See MacDonald, 710 F.3d at 166 (citing Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 328-30).
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majority was wrong because Lawrence was clear about the limits of its
holding. 89 Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court identified four such limits:
the protected conduct in Lawrence was (1) consensual, (2) noncommercial, (3)
private, and (4) between two adults. 90 The Virginia courts easily identified these
limits after Lawrence, as did many other courts. 91
These are also precisely the limits contained in a failed legislative fix for
Lawrence in Virginia-a fix that may have failed because the bill also would
have reduced the seriousness of the offense. 92 Indeed, given Lawrence's clear
statements about what that case did not involve, the Virginia legislature could
have accomplished the same amendment of section 18.2-361(A) by simply
appending a different proviso: "Provided, however, that this statute may not be
enforced with respect to conduct constitutionally protected under Lawrence v.
Texas." This shows at bottom what is wrong with MacDonald v. Moose. A
proviso of this sort is already present by operation oflaw, even though the words
do not appear in Virginia's statute books. When MacDonald was prosecuted, the
applicable law included not only Virginia Code section 18.2-361(A) but also
Lawrence. 93 The job of the court was not to figure out whether Lawrence
required taking anything out of section 18.2-361(A), but rather, how to apply
both that statute and Lawrence.
To recognize that the superior law of the Constitution as set forth in
Lawrence would limit the application of Virginia Code section 18.2-361(A), it
would not have been necessary for the judiciary to write words into the statute
(actually or metaphorically). To see why, consider some other examples. A
state statute does not have to recite that it is unenforceable in circumstances
outside the state's legislative jurisdiction; the limits oflegislative jurisdiction are
background rules of legislation. A legislature does not have to rewrite its longarm statute to specify that it does not apply to circumstances in which the
exercise of personal jurisdiction under the statute would violate due process.

89. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (stating that the case does not involve
minors, acts of coercion, public conduct, or prostitution).
90. Id.
91. See, e.g., McDonald v. Commonwealth, 630 S.E.2d 754, 757 (Va. Ct. App. 2006) ("That
[Lawrence's] holding does not apply to minors is one of four exceptions to the Court's holding.
The Supreme Court found that acts involving minors along with non-consensual acts, public
conduct, and prostitution do not merit due process protection." (citing Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578)).
92. See S.B. 477, 2004 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2004), available at http://lis.
virginia.gov/cgi-bin/legp604.exe?04 l +ful+SB477S1 (providing that the sodomy prohibition "shall
not apply where all persons are consenting adults who are not in a public place and who are not
aiding, abetting, procuring, engaging in or performing any act in furtherance of prostitution"); see
also Kevin C. Walsh, A Closer Look at Virginia's 'Lawrence Fix' Shows Cuccinelli's Consistency
and Fourth Circuit's Faulty Conclusion, WALSHSLAW (Aug. 13, 2013), http://walshslaw.
wordpress.com/2013/08/ 13/a-closer-look-at-virginias-lawrence-fix-shows-cuccinellis-consistencyand-fourth-circuits- faulty-conclusion/.
93. Lawrence was decided in 2003, prior to MacDonald's arrest and conviction. See
Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558; MacDonald, 710 F.3d at 155.
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And so on. 94 Similarly, the Virginia legislature did not have to write into its
statute that it would be unenforceable in circumstances in which its enforcement
would violate the Constitution. That is a background rule of our legal system
that operates of its own force. The panel majority's concerns about judicial
rewriting in MacDonald v. Moose were simply misplaced.
V.

CONCLUSION

Right or wrong, the panel majority's conv1ct10ns about the partial facial
unconstitutionality of Virginia Code section 18.2-361(A) carried the day. The
Fourth Circuit denied rehearing en bane and the Supreme Court denied
certiorari. 95 While this additional federal appellate consideration was taking
place, discussions about MacDonald v. Moose spilled over into the 2013
Virginia gubernatorial campaign. 96 A case that began as a straightforward
appeal from the denial of habeas relief turned into a political beach ball batted
around by both campaigns and a source of late night humor. 97 With the
campaign spectacles now but a memory, the principles of law formulated and
applied in MacDonald v. Moose continue to govern in the Fourth Circuit. And
that is why it remains worthwhile to subject the decision to careful criticism.
The principles that matter the most, however, are not those specific to the
interpretation and application of Lawrence v. Texas and Virginia Code section
18.2-361(A). The fate of this one statutory provision under that one case is
much less important than the understanding of judicial review that erroneously
led to its partial facial invalidation.

94. See Edward A. Hartnett, Facial and As-Applied Challenges to the Individual Mandate of
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 745, 758-59 (2012)
(explaining how a displacement-based understanding of judicial review can "pull us away from
insisting that an inferior law recite and include the provisions of higher law, as opposed to simply
giving way to the extent higher law itself governs"); Kevin C. Walsh, Partial Unconstitutionality,
85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 738, 778-80 (2010) (describing a displacement-based approach to judicial
review in contrast with the reigning excision-based approach).
95. Moose v. MacDonald, 134 S. Ct. 200 (2013) (denying petition for writ of certiorari).
96. Ben Pershing, Cuccinelli Looks to Go on Offense over Sodomy Law, WASH. POST, July
17,2013,atB3.
97. See, e.g., id. ("When Virginia Attorney General Ken Cuccinelli II challenged a federal
appeals court ruling that deemed the state's anti-sodomy law unconstitutional, Democrats pounced,
accusing the Republicans of pursuing an anti-gay agenda. Now Cuccinelli's campaign for governor
is looking to turn the tables .... "); see also The Daily Show with Jon Stewart: Sodomy! Zygotes!
Welfare! (Comedy Central television broadcast Apr. 9, 2013), http://www.thedailyshow.com/
watch/tue-april-9-2013/sodomy-zygotes-welfare-.

